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THE AFTERMATH OF THE DD ACT: IS THERE LIFE
AFTER PENNHURST?
Penelope 4. Boyd*
Handicapped persons have always suffered from the popular
opinion that they are somehow lesser beings. Of the enormous vari-
eties and types of handicapping conditions, "mental retardation" re-
mains one of the surer tickets to relegation to subhuman status' and
second-class citizenship. The monuments to this perception of the
retarded exist throughout the United States in the form of large in-
stitutions, 2 often euphemistically termed "state schools" or "devel-
opmental centers." For the past decade, assaults on these
permanent way-stations for the citizens of the United States labelled
"mentally retarded ' 3 have been prevalent in the media and in the
courts, seeking the improvement of the physical conditions of insti-
* B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1976; J.D., Villanova University School of
Law, 1979. Ms. Boyd is co-counsel for the original plaintiffs, Halderman, et.al., in Halder-
man v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital. She would like to express her appreciation to
Joseph Otis Minott, a third year student at the Villanova University School of Law, for his
assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. See Wolfensburger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, in CHANG-
ING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES TO MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS 59 (R. Kugel
& W. Wolfensburger, eds. 1976).
2. Id.
3. The concept of mental retardation is one that is fluid, being a label for individuals
with difficulties in adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning. Mason & Menolascino,
The Right to Treatmentfor Mentally Retarded Citizens.- An Evolving Legal and Scientific In-
terface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 124 n.1 (1977). For purposes of this article, the term
will be used only as it is imposed by others, ie., when someone has labelled a person as
retarded and has treated him/her as such. See P. FRIEDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY
RETARDED PERSONS 14 (1976).
Mental retardation is a social construct, not a single clinical entity. The term has no
precise or absolute meaning, and there is considerable disagreement as to its upper margin.
'Mental retardation', as defined by the American Association on Mental Deficiency, 'refers
to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with defi-
cits in adaptive behavior' and appearing in the 'developmental period.' In plain English, a
mechanistic interpretation reduces this definition to three elements: a label applied to a
person who scores below 97% of the population on standardized intelligence tests, who also
lacks the social skills to cope with his/her particular environment, and who also has been
recognized as having had those problems of adaptive behavior since childhood or early ado-
lescence. Herr, The New Clients.- Legal Servicesfor Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 553, 555 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The New Clients] (quoting AMERICAN ASS'N ON
MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 5 (rev. ed. H. Grossman 1977)).
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tutions and the provision of services to enable personal develop-
ment, ie., habilitation.4 Litigation has resulted in court orders for
improvements in the institutions,5 as well as consent decrees for the
creation of services for retarded citizens in their communities.6 On
April 20, 1981, litigation as a means of bringing the lives of the re-
tarded out of the nineteenth century was set back when the United
States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman7 (hereinafter Pennhurst) which reversed
an en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit holding that the
mentally retarded had a right to habilitation8 under the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 9 (hereinafter
the DD Act). While the full ramifications of the Court's narrow
decision have yet to be realized, the potential for judicial deperson-
alization of the retarded through factual sterilization of lower court
findings (which Pennhurst represents) needs to be explored in light
of the history of the statute involved and the institution to which it
was applied.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital opened its doors in the
early 1900's, as the Eastern State School for the Feeble-Minded and
Epileptic, for the purpose of segregating and training retarded and
epileptic persons of eastern Pennsylvania.10 Conditions at the insti-
tution first spurred litigation to secure access to education for men-
tally retarded children in Pennsylvania," and finally, in the instant
case, to assure access to habilitation for all its residents (both chil-
dren and adults).'
2
4. "Proper terminology would recognize that mental retardation is a highly varied,
relative, and dynamic condition, and would classify people, if at all, in terms of resources or
services they require." The New Clients, supra note 3, at 555.
5. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, modified in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
6. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
7. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
8. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), qf'g on
other grounds, modifying in part, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
10. 1913 Pa. Laws 328.
11. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (three judge court) (consent decree), enforced, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See generally The New Clients, supra note 3.
12. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
af/'d in part, modified and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded,
101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981). The history of the case is discussed in detail in Ferleger & Boyd,
Anti-Institutionalization." The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Anti-Institutionalization].
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At the time of trial, the institution housed 1200 retarded per-
sons in overcrowded and filthy wards, where residents suffered
physical and psychological deterioration. 3 Lack of needed services
was constant.' 4 Residents of Pennhurst spent their lives as part of a
ward or unit--eating, bathing, and dressing in group fashion.'-' The
remainder of their days was spent in enforced idleness-sitting in
day rooms without activities or programs to develop individual po-
tential.16 As a result, the residents of Pennhurst became progres-
sively more handicapped.' 7 What is perhaps the saddest fact is that
throughout the trial, experts and state officials unanimously testified
that no one needed to be at Pennhurst, and, that given appropriate
services, all could and should be served in the community.' 8 There-
fore, the relief sought (and granted by the district court) was first,
the replacement of the institution with the provision of services in
the community,' 9 and second, the immediate improvement of the
institution pending the development of necessary services.2 °
Habilitation is a term of art not susceptible of easy definition
without reference to the individual to be habilitated. Generally, it is
described as "that education, training, and care required by retarded
individuals to reach their maximum development.' 2  The concept,
like the concept of retardation, is fluid, requiring assessment of indi-
vidual needs and strengths and the development or provision of
means of meeting the needs.22 Two broad principles apply to the
habilitative process: First, that all mentally retarded persons, given
appropriate services, can grow and develop, thereby becoming more
self-sufficient, 23 and second, that the development of the retarded is
enhanced when they are treated as much like non-handicapped per-
13. The failures of Pennhurst as an institution are outlined in the district court opinion,
446 F. Supp. at 1302-11. See also Anti-Institutionalization, supra note 12, at 725-26.
14. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
15. Id. at 1303.
16. Id. at 1304.
17. Id. at 1309.
18. See id. at 1313.
19. Id. at 1298.
20. 446 F. Supp. at 1328-29. See also Order of March 5, 1979, as amended April 24,
1980, 3.0-5.0.
21. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
22. Supra note 4.





Large institutions, isolated from society, are antithetical to the
habilitative process. Because of chronic underfunding (and conse-
quent understaffing) these institutions simply fail to deal with their
residents as individuals." Contrary to popular assumption, this de-
personalized environment is damaging to severely handicapped per-
sons; it causes them to suffer physical and intellectual deterioration.
Handicapped persons need an individualized environment,26 one
characterized by individual planning, individual programs, and in-
dividual goals. Without this individualized orientation, persons re-
leased from institutions will, in all likelihood, be
reinstitutionalized,27 or suffer similar privations in the community.
Long before the district court opinion in Pennhurst, individual-
ized attention had been mandated by law in Pennsylvania. 2 By
regulation, mentally retarded persons were entitled to individual as-
sessments of needs and to the provision of services designed to meet
those needs29 to avoid "unnecessary and prolonged" institutional-
ization through the coordination and development of services in the
community.30 The promise of individual attention had not been
kept for the persons confined at Pennhurst. For many residents of
Pennhurst, the services needed to enable them to leave the institu-
tion were not identified,3' much less offered.
Following extensive findings of fact on the conditions of Penn-
hurst, the nature of mental retardation, and the opportunities of-
fered by adequate habilitation, the district court entered its opinion,
holding on alternative grounds that there was a right to habilitation
under the Constitution, the Rehabilitation Act, and Pennsylvania
law.32 Both the conditions at Pennhurst and the systemic deficien-
24. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312-13
(E.D. Pa. 1977). See also NiIje, The Normalization Princile and its Human Management
Implications, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES TO MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZENS 129 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensburger, eds. 1976).
25. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1304-05 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
26. Laski, Right to Services in the Community: Implications of the Pennhurst Case, NOR-
MALIZATION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION, AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 167, 173 (Flynn & Nitsch,
eds. 1980).
27. Id. at 174.
28. Mental Retardation Regulations § 5200, app. IV, 3 Pa. Bulletin 285 (Feb. 10, 1973).
29. 3 Pa. Bulletin at 285-86. See also In re Schmidt, 429 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981).
30. 3 Pa. Bulletin at 285-86.
31. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1305 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
32. Id. at 1320-25. This relief was granted on the basis of constitutional rights to habili-
19811
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cies which caused persons to be placed there were addressed.
The remedial process was developed slowly and carefully by
the district court. The original order laying the foundation for the
process of developing community placements for the plaintiff class
was entered on March 17, 1978, after the defendants had failed to
propose a suitable remedial alternative.33 This order enjoined the
defendants to provide individual plans and programs for commu-
nity services to class members and enjoined certain health and
safety violations at the institution.34 The order also provided for the
appointment of a special master, with monitoring and planning
functions, to assist the court in the implementation of the order, pri-
marily by monitoring the defendants' compliance.35 This order was
appealed by the defendants.
The order of March 17, 1978, was made more specific by a sub-
sequent order entered March 5, 1979, governing the interim opera-
tions of Pennhurst. This order began the establishment of specific
requirements for orderly development of community services for the
residents of the institution and set certain requirements for condi-
tions at Pennhurst. The community placement process was begun
with the order for the hiring of a number of case managers by the
defendants to concentrate specifically on members of the plaintiff
class.36 Case managers, as the individuals responsible for the assess-
ment of needs and the identification and securing of services, were
central to the planning and service delivery process. 7 Thus, the
ability to provide individualized assessments was augmented so that
Pennhurst residents could be reintegrated into the service delivery
system. That the class members would actually benefit from the sys-
tem was assured, in part, by that portion of the order which required
the development of an individual habilitation plan for any class
tation, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1981-1982). These causes of action and the district
court's opinion are analysed in Anti-Institutionalization, supra note 12.
33. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania repeated its offer made at trial, to transfer 100
Pennhurst residents to other institutions, to place individuals in the community at a rate of
14 persons per month for 18 months and to invest $2.4 million in improving the facility.
This would have left 850 people at the institution. Laski, Supra note 26, at 169.
34. Among the improvements ordered were the elimination of filth and vermin, the
provision of necessary adaptive equipment (i.e., wheelchairs) a prohibition on the use of
major tranquilizers and physical restraints to control Pennhurst residents, and the provision
of adequate medical services. 446 F. Supp. at 1328-29.
35. Id. at 1326.
36. Order of March 5, 1979.
37. See Mental Retardation Regulations, § 5400, app. IV, supra note 28.
[Vol. 4:448
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member, reviewed and approved by the Special Master, prior to his
or her relocation.38
On December 13, 1979, the court of appeals affirmed, with
modifications, the opinion and order of the district court39 on the
basis of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act,4° and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act.4 ' The court of appeals held, inter alia, that the Bill of Rights
section of the DD Act, section 6010, passed pursuant to section five
of the fourteenth amendment, conferred upon the developmentally
disabled, beneficiaries of the Act, here residents of Pennhurst, a
right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment. The court
held that Congress intended to create a presumption in favor of
community living arrangements as the means of habilitation 2.4  The
major modification in relief mandated by the court of appeals was a
more formalized consideration of individual needs for institutional-
ization.43 This was to be accomplished by assessments and planning
with the presumption in favor of community living arrangements.
44
Reversing the court of appeals, the United States Supreme
Court held that section 6010 alone created no substantive rights in
the mentally retarded to appropriate treatment in the least restric-
tive environment.45 The Court determined that the rights involved
would impose affirmative (and financial) obligations upon the state,
and that it thus could not be inferred that Congress was acting pur-
suant to its section five powers unless the intent to draw upon those
powers was stated explicitly.46 Nor could Congress have imposed
such obligations under its spending power, the Court reasoned, in
the absence of an unambiguous imposition of a condition in the stat-
ute.47 Thus, it was held that Congress intended to create no substan-
tive rights under section 6010 of the DD Act for the residents of
Pennhurst. This decision must be examined in light of the extensive
history and unique structure of the DD Act.
38. Order of March 5, 1979, 11.0. See also Office of the Special Master, Guidelines
for Case Managers (August 1980, rev'd). Admissions to Pennhurst were enjoined by the
district court. 446 F. Supp. at 1327.
39. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1981-1982).
42. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1979).
43. Id. at 104-07.
44. Id. at 113-15.
45. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540-45 (1981).
46. Id. at 1540-42.
47. Id. at 1542-44.
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The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act has a history which tracks congressional involvement on behalf
of the mentally retarded with near precision. Federal action was
initiated by President John F. Kennedy with the establishment of
the first President's Panel on Mental Retardation in the early
1960's.48 Congress responded to the work of this panel, finding that
comprehensive services to retarded citizens were needed and that
existing facilities were overcrowded, obsolete, and inappropriate.49
The Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 196350 offered
federal financial assistance to the states for the construction of new
facilities and development of community services. This Act was re-
vised and extended in 1967 to add a grant program to be used, first,
to teach professionals in community retardation programs how to
avoid institutionalization and, second, to continue fiscal support of
community programs and comprehensive services for retarded per-
sons." In 1970, the class of beneficiaries of the Act was expanded to
include persons with developmental disabilities.5 2 Finally, in 1975,
Congress added a Bill of Rights to its funding statute. The 1975 DD
Act,53 with its 1978 Amendments, 4 was the focus of the Supreme
Court opinion. The Court focused particularly on section 6010,
which enumerated congressional findings of the rights of develop-
mentally disabled persons.
The format for receipt of funds has been unchanged since
1970. 55 A state wishing to participate submits a state plan,56 which
48. See The President's Panel on Mental Retardation, Report of the Task Force on Law,
10-12, 41 (1963).
49. H.R. REP. No. 694, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess., reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1054, 1061-62. Preference for community services was apparent:
Sheltered workshops can be of great assistance as a part of a comprehensive center
organized to restore the mentally retarded to the maximum degree of normal living
in his community. In the absence of a coordinated program of services, the men-
tally retarded person is denied the opportunity to develop most fully his potential
for contributing to our society.
Id. at 1061.
50. Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282.
51. Mental Retardation Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-170, 81 Stat. 527.
52. Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316.
53. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-103, 89 Stat. 486.
54. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amend-
ments of 1978, title V, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
55. Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 6063 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
[Vol. 4:448
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must contain detailed plans of utilization of funds and assurances.57
This plan, reviewed by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices, if approved by the Secretary 58 in essence triggers the flow of
DD Act money, to be used with other state and federal funds to
provide needed services.
Section 6010, the "Bill of Rights," was the heart of the Supreme
Court decision. It has its own legislative history. The addition of a
"Bill of Rights" to the funding statute may be attributed to the fail-
ure of the grant program to significantly affect the lives of the devel-
opmentally disabled, particularly those in state institutions.5 9 The
Bill of Rights was first presented to the Senate in 1973, following
media exposure of conditions at Willowbrook State School, the na-
tion's largest institution for the retarded.60 The proposed legislation
was intended to insure habilitation by the establishment of detailed
standards for residential facilities and minimization of inappropri-
ate admissions to institutions.
6'
The bill was followed in 1974 by another62 which was substan-
tially equivalent,63 with congressional interest further heightened by
a study by the General Accounting Office which revealed continuing
serious gaps in services to the retarded, with disparities among the
states and within the states.64 Again, the purpose of the bill was to
establish standards for habilitation and to discourage institutional-
ization. 65 This bill was reintroduced in 1975, setting forth detailed
57. Id. § 6063(b).
58. Id. § 6063(c)-(d).
59. See Halderman v. Permhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
60. The bill, S. 458, and its grant counterpart, S. 427, are reprinted in Developmental
Disabilities Act Extension and Rights of Mentally Retarded" Hearing on S. 427 and S 458
Before Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearing]. See S. REP. No. 94-160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1975).
61. 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 229-30; 121 CONG. REC. 29820 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Javits); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act: Hearing on S 3378
Before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter 1974 Hearing].
The remedial process by the setting of standards is one that had been utilized by federal
courts in the enforcement of the constitutional rights to habilitation. See Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aJJ'd inpart, modified in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. S. 3378, reprinted in 1974 Hearings, supra note 61.
63. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 3-4. S. 3378 extended the standards of S. 459
to community facilities. 1974 Hearing, supra note 61, at 273 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
64. 1974 Hearing, supra note 61, at 1-2; 121 CONG. REC. 29817 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Randolph).
65. See S. 3378, Title II, § 201, reprinted in 1974 Hearing, supra note 61, at 44.
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standards for residential and community placements. 66 The Act, in
its present form, emerged.67 Section 6010 states congressional find-
ings on the rights of developmentally disabled persons, 68 emphasizes
individual rights of disabled persons, 69 and sets standards for insti-
tutions and programs. 0 It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to ap-
propriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such
disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with
developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the
developmental potential of the person and should be provided in
the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obli-
gation to assure that public funds are not provided to any...
program . . . that (A) does not provide treatment, services, and
habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards ....
The congressional factual findings are important here, and particu-
larly enlightening given the factual findings by the district court.
While Pennhurst as an institution was not before Congress, the
findings of the district court in Pennhurst and the findings of Con-
gress which precipitated section 6010 were parallel and consistent.
Both found that mental retardation was an educational handicap,
not a disease, and that the retarded were not subhuman, eugenic
misfits, or eternal children and should not be made the objects of
pity.72 Further, they found that these myths and misconceptions
had resulted in the segregation, sterilization, and stigmatization of
66. See H. R. REP. 94-473, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 943. See
also S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 4.
67. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89
Stat. 486, title 11 (1975). In 1978, when the planning program of the "assistance" section of
the Act, title I, was substantially revised (although not redirected), the Bill of Rights, title V,
was unchanged, except for Congress' addition of special emphasis that the rights in this
section were in addition to rights possessed by all persons. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, title V,
§ 507, 92 Stat. 3007.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
69. Id. § 6010(1)-(2).
70. Id. § 6010(3)-(4).
71. Id. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (quoted in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1537 (1981)).
72. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 27-28; Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
456 [Vol. 4:448
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retarded individuals. 73 Congress and the district court both adopted
the developmental model of services to the retarded, finding that,
with proper habilitation, every retarded persQn is capable of growth
toward self-sufficiency,74 and that simple custodial care75 "must be
rejected. ' 76  Both also found that normalization is integral to the
habilitation of the retarded, and must therefore, by definition, occur
in an environment that is least restrictive to the person.7
The district court's findings of fact regarding Pennhurst coin-
cided with congressional factual determinations regarding institu-
tions. Both found that despite a decade of federal funding,
conditions giving rise to litigation remained and that dramatic steps
were needed.78 Institutions, it was found, do not provide habilita-
73. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 26-27; 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 253; 446
F. Supp. 1291-1300.
74. Such a view stresses that all developmentally disabled individuals have poten-
tial for learning and growth.
From this developmental model, it follows that custodial care-which is pred-
icated on the assumption that certain individuals are essentially incapable of devel-
opment-must be rejected. The newer developmental model emphasizes concrete
program goals for individuals and therefore encourages evaluation based on spe-
cific outcomes.
S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 28. See [1967] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2061,
2071; 124 CONG. REC. 15562 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 124 CONG. REC. 15571
(1978) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
75. Custodial care is simply life-maintenance activities with no training services. Such
care is inappropriate for any retarded person. "No line divides mentally retarded persons
who can benefit from habilitation from those who cannot; on the contrary, even the most
profoundly retarded 'can and do profit from habilitation efforts.'" The New Clients, supra
note 3, at 561.
76. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 28; 446 F. Supp. at 1298.
77. A final, but critically important dimension of this new model is that develop-
mentally disabled persons should live like non-developmentally disabled persons
to the greatest degree possible. Every effort should be made to assist developmen-
tally disabled persons to maximize their ability for self-care and to live normal
lives. From this, it also follows that each developmentally disabled person should
be allowed to live in the least restrictive environment conducive to his or her maxi-
mum development.
S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 28. See also 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 564; 446 F.
Supp. at 1318; 612 F.2d at 93.
78. The last four years have seen a dramatic increase in public awareness of the
needs of institutionalized mentally retarded or developmentally disabled persons.
This has been highlighted by scandals in a number of institutions, by court cases,
and by some excellent work done in the mass media. Testimony before this com-
mittee persuasively demonstrated that implementation and enforcement of mini-
mum standards of care in institutions for the developmentally disabled are
urgently needed and that the Federal government can and should play a significant
role in upgrading the care and services provided to developmentally disabled per-
sons in public and other facilities which operate with Federal funds.
S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 3.
458 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:448
tion,79 are dangerous physically,8" and cause further mental and
physical handicaps.8 l In both cases, state officials conceded that the
institutions were inhumane and non-habilitative, 82 and that many of
them should be phased out.
83
Elimination of the institution, it was recognized, would not
solve the problem; sufficient community services were needed. 84 As
the "vast majority of persons now institutionalized should not be in
these institutions at all,"' 85 a determination of individual needs was
required.86 Institutionalization was permissible only when "abso-
lutely necessary" 87 and when the person's needs could be met by the
79. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 16, 28, 30, 32-33 ("It is not, however, the
Committee's intent that enactment of this title should be construed in any way to constitute
support of institutionalization of the mentally retarded." Id. at 33); 446 F. Supp. at 1318.
[M]ost large institutions for the [mentally retarded and] developmentally disabled
in the U.S. lack individualized treatment plans and programs. That is, care is pri-
marily custodial; and little attention is paid to the resident's potential for increased
self care, ability to utilize education or training.
S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 30. Institutions "lack any commitment to change and
have not accepted the developmental model described above." Id. at 28.
80. 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 567 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); S. REP. No. 94-
160, supra note 60, at 28, 30; 446 F. Supp. at 1304-10.
81. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 28; 1973 Hearing, supra note 63, at 229-30; 446
F. Supp. at 1304-10.
82. "The inhumane and nonhabilitation aspects of these large institutions have unfortu-
nately been graphically demonstrated over and over again. In a number of crucial court
cases, for example, the defendants were only too willing to stipulate that the conditions
described by the plaintiffs were accurate." S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 32; 446 F.
Supp. at 1313; 612 F.2d at 92.
83. Efforts to assure proper treatment, education, and habilitation services in large
institutions should not deflect attention from the fact that most of these institutions
themselves are anachronisms, and that rapid steps should be taken to phase them
out. Many of these institutions by their very nature, their size, their isolation, their
impersonality, are unsuitable for treatment, education, and habilitation programs.
S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 32-33; 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 253; 446 F.
Supp. at 1318. Many of the institutions can best be described as "hopeless places" dedicated
to custodial care of lifelong residents. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 28.
84. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 30; 121 CONG. REC. 16516 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Williams); 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 563; 121 CONG. REC. 9965 (1975) (remarks
of Rep. Young); id. at 9977 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Carter); 446 F. Supp. at 1312.
Congressional support for community services for severely handicapped people was re-
affirmed in its funding of centers for independent living under the 1978 Amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 3007.
85. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 32.
86. 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 254, 563; H.R. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 32-33, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 943, 952; S. REP. No. 94-160,
supra note 60, at 30; 121 CONG. REC. 9977 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Carter); 446 F. Supp. at
1311-12; 612 F.2d at 115.
87. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 16.
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institution.88
Congress was aware of its complicity in this situation. Despite
prior programs, institutional conditions remained abominable89 de-
spite "[e]ncouraging, but limited progress. . . made under the pres-
ent law."90  Congress decided to strengthen the existing grant
program 9' by codifying the constitutional right to habilitation enun-
ciated in cases decided by the federal courts:
92
Title II is designed to assist in the protection of human rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of those mentally retarded
and other developmentally disabled individuals who require in-
stitutional care or need community facilities and programs. 93
The Court failed to find the legislative history persuasive, pre-
ferring to emphasize the "assistance" language of the statute over its
rights language.94 In addition, the Court repeatedly alluded to the
88. Id. at 1, 33; 121 CONG. REC. 16520 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits). See id. at 16470,
16516-17 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 16522 (remarks of Sen. Beall); id. (remarks of
Sen. Schweiker); id. at 16520 (remarks of Sen. Cranston) ("Where institutional programs are
appropriate. . . habilitation programs can be given residential patients to develop their full
potential.")
89. 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 562-63.
90. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 2. The "current law" was the federal-state
grant program. Mental Retardation Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-170, 81 Stat. 527.
91. 121 CONG. REC. 29821 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
92. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 2-3, 30-33; 121 CONG. REC. 16515 (1975)
(remarks of Sen. Randolph); id. at 16516 (remarks of Sen. Stafford); id. at 16516-17 (remarks
of Sen. Williams); id. at 16519 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 16522 (remarks of Sen. Beall);
id. (remarks of Sen. Taft); 1973 Hearing, supra note 60, at 250. The standards set were
considered the "absolute minimum" so as not to "violate the Constitutional rights of the
individuals in those programs." S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 38. E.g., New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Hora-
cek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), af'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
93. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra note 60, at 34. Title II, headed "Establishment and Pro-
tection of the Rights of Persons with Developmental Disabilities" opens with section 111,
Congressional Findings Respecting Rights of the Developmentally Disabled (42 U.S.C.
§ 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 16510-20 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Javits); id. at 29309 (remarks of Rep. Rogers).
These rights are generally included in the conference substitute in recognition by
the conferees that the developmentally disabled, particularly those who have the
misfortune to require institutionalization, have a right to receive appropriate treat-
ment for the condition for which they are institutionalized, and that this right
should be protected and assured by Congress and the Courts.
H.R. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-52, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 943, 961-62. See also 121 CONG. REC. 29818 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph);
id. at 29821 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 124 CONG. REC. 15547 (1978) (remarks of
Sen. Randolph).
94. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1536-43 (1981).
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lack of congressional intent to create new, substantive rights.9
While it is certainly true that Congress at no time believed it was
creating a novel right to habilitation, and that Congress supplied
funding to assist in alleviating the conditions under which develop-
mentally disabled persons were forced to exist, neither of these facts
precluded the result reached by the court of appeals, iLe., that Con-
gress was adopting, by statute, what it believed to be an existing
constitutional right.96
The lack of congressional intent to impose affirmative obliga-
tions to fund services upon the states as a result of section 6010
weighed heavily in the United States Supreme Court decision. 97
The legislative history of the right indicates no intention to obligate
states to fund services; however, the nature of the right and the
funding structure of the Act required neither the states nor the fed-
eral government to expend funds to assure the rights of the develop-
mentally disabled beneficiaries.
The constitutional right to habilitation as determined by the
district court (and referenced throughout the legislative history of
the DD Act) relies initially upon the fourteenth amendment.9 8 This
right is predicated on a contractual theory of exchange: when a
state accepts a retarded individual into its mental retardation sys-
tem, the state must provide the habilitative services which the per-
son requires in order to justify the deprivation of individual
liberty.99 As the district court noted, the Constitution does not re-
quire that the state initially undertake the obligation to provide for
its retarded citizens.'°° Rather it requires that once the obligation is
assumed, it must be fulfilled.
Contrary to the findings of the district court and the legislative
history of the Act, the Supreme Court assumed that enforcement of
95. Id. at 1536-45.
96. The Senate report specifically refers to such litigation. S. REP. No. 94-160, supra
note 60, at 30-33 (citing Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affdsub nor.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)).
97. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1542-44 (1981).
98. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 466 F. Supp. 1295, 1314-20 (E.D.
Pa. 1977). The right, often stated as the right to habilitation in the least restrictive alterna-
tive, is redundant, since adequate habilitation requires normalization; special consideration
of the least restrictive environment is not needed, but does serve to emphasize the normali-
zation necessary.
99. 466 F. Supp. at 1317-18. See Anti-nstitutiona/ization, supra note 12, at 733. This
constitutional right is to be distinguished from the right to protection from harm discussed
infra.
100. 446 F. Supp. at 1318. Most states have undertaken the obligation.
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the right would entail massive fiscal expenditures by the states.' 0'
The district court in its consideration of the financial repercussions
of enforcement of the constitutional right, found that appropriate
habilitative services would be significantly less expensive than the
operation of Pennhurst. 02 Nothing in the legislative history indi-
cated an intention to impose a massive financial obligation under
the DD Act, in large part because of the enormity of existing federal
programs which could be used by the states to implement the
right. 10 3 Billions of federal dollars were (and are) provided to the
states for mental retardation services."° While the amounts specifi-
cally allocated under the DD Act are relatively small,'0 5 the DD Act
assistance provisions were intended to leverage other federal monies
for use in habilitative programs.
0 6
All in all, the Supreme Court's opinion, albeit narrow, presents
some disturbing implications. At least when retarded citizens are
concerned, the Court appears to be not only willing to make its own
factual findings but also willing to do so, first, on the representation
of parties in the face of congressional factual determinations, sec-
ond, on an extensive record to the contrary, and, third, without re-
gard for the fact that the defendants did not challenge the factual
determinations of the trial court as being clearly erroneous. 0 7 As
such, Pennhurst may be seen as a case in which the Court, rather
than exercising its usual deference to a congressional enactment,'08
has acted in extraordinary deference to the states, by finding that
101. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1546-47 (1981).
102. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (E.D. Pa.
1977). See also 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1552-55 (White, J., dissenting).
103. 121 CONG. REC. 16519 (1975). The sum for fiscal year 1970 was $3.168 billion.
104. Brief of Respondents PARC, et al., at 28 (citing U.S. Dept. of Health, Education &
Welfare, Special Report Mental Retardation in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on De-
partments of Labor, HEW and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 641-44, 673).
105. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's State Plan.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6063 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (State plan must include non-duplication).
See Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970;
Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316.
For example, Pennsylvania received $174,449,724 in fiscal year 1978 under title XIX of
the Social Security Act for Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, 42
U.S.C. § 1396(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Center on Human Policy, Title XIXand Deinstitu-
tionalization: The Issue for the 80's 13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Title XIX and Deinstitu-
tionalization]. The majority of this money is being poured into institutions. Id. at 20. The
funds can be tised for habilitative community facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(d) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
107. Eg., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1949);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).
108. Eg,, Schwelker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981).
19811
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Congress was not serious enough in its enactment of a rights section
in its legislation, thereby "mak[ing] nugatory actions so carefully
undertaken."'' 09 The Court did not, however, consider several re-
maining causes of action which still may be used to support the re-
lief ordered by the district court in Pennhurst and in other cases
involving similar institutions. 0 Two means of achieving the de-
sired relief are possible: the right to protection from harm and state
law.
Alternative constitutional grounds for the right to habilitation
may be found in the eighth and fourteenth amendments.'I' Taken
together, these amendments secure a person's right to protection
from harm while the person is in the custody of governmental au-
thorities." 2 The right was initially recognized in cases involving
prison conditions, but courts have found that retarded persons were
at least entitled to the minimum conditions of confinement constitu-
tionally mandated for prisoners."
3
A series of recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
concerning the eighth amendment suggests in the aggregate an in-
ferential basis for a strengthened claim to a right of the institutional-
ized mentally retarded person to habilitation. While application of
the eighth amendment is limited to formally adjudicated crimes, 4
the Court has admitted possible eighth amendment scrutiny of
mental institutions." 5 The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibits the punishment of innocent persons" 6 who
have not been convicted of a crime. At the same time the eighth
109. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1549 (1981).
110. The Court remanded constitutional claims, claims under the Rehabilitation Act and
claims under Pennsylvania law. Each of these claims had been the basis for the relief or-
dered by the district court, and with the exception of state law, had not been considered by
the court of appeals.
11. See, e.g., Anti-Institutionalization, supra note 12, at 739-4 1.
112. E.g., Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (ED. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Anti-Institutionalization, supra note
12, at 739.
113. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
114. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147,
156 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981).
115. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977).
116. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16. See also Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147,
156 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981). The Court did suggest in Woifish,
however, that the pretrial detainees involved had at least the rights of sentenced prisoners.
441 U.S. at 545.
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amendment limits what may be defined and punished as a crime." 17
Thus, the Constitution would forbid the use of mental retardation
either as a criminal classification or to countenance institutionaliza-
tion that was tantamount to punishment.
Although institutionalized, mentally retarded persons are
outside the criminal process; they are nevertheless subjected to con-
finement for extended periods of time. " I8 They have a protected lib-
erty interest and concomitantly a right to be free from confinement
which is tantamount to punishment.1 9 At a minimum, governmen-
tal action toward the confined mentally retarded person cannot be
arbitrary or purposeless.120 There must be a reasonable relationship
between the conditions of confinement and legitimate governmental
objectives in order to fall outside of the realm of punishment.'12
Governmental justification for the confinement of the retarded
generally falls into one of three areas: protection of society from
dangerous persons, protection of an individual who is dangerous to
himself, or provision of needed services (i e., treatment or habilita-
tion).' 22 Fulfillment of these nonpunitive purposes must be bal-
anced against the fundamental interest of the mentally retarded
citizen in his or her personal security. 23 This balancing process fol-
lows a continuum, depending on the nature and extent of the gov-
ernment intrusion.
24
Severe restrictions of bodily movement raise a "presumption of
a punitive sanction."' 125 Such restrictions include the use of re-
straints, 126 as well as the confinement of a person in unhealthy, un-
sanitary conditions. 27 The use of such measures may be justified
only by compelling necessity, which requires the investigation of al-
117. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2398 n.12 (1981) (citing Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
118. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 158 n.15. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1302 (average length of stay at Pennhurst is 21 years). Cf.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 543 (length of stay averaged sixty days).
119. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 536-37.
120. Id. at 539.
121. Id.
122. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 158. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972); Anti-Insitutionaliation, supra note 12.
123. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-75 (1977).
124. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 158-59.
125. Id. at 159.
126. Id.




ternatives, in particular, alternatives which are least restrictive.' 28
When institutionalization further results in multiple injuries
from the attacks of others and from self-injury caused by a failure to
offer habilitative services, the fundamental interest in liberty is like-
wise infringed upon129 and is constitutionally protected in the ab-
sence of "substantial necessity."'' 30 Substantial necessity does not
exist where the mentally retarded person is subjected to ongoing or
consistent injury.
In and of themselves, each of the constitutional requirements
could serve as the basis for relief ordered by the district court in
Pennhurst and for similar institutions, such as those examined by
Congress in its enactment of the DD Act. The gross deprivations
inherent in continued confinement in such institutions is clearly pu-
nitive, particularly where the result is ongoing physical and intellec-
tual deterioration. With the alternative of appropriate community
settings, long-term institutionalization of the mentally retarded can
be justified neither on the basis of substantial necessity (since it is a
persistent disregard for the needs of the retarded individual) or as
the least restrictive alternative (since institutionalization is inappro-
priate for any retarded person given individually designed commu-
nity services).' 3' Considering the punitive nature of these
institutions, a community services program is clearly the least re-
strictive alternative with an emphasis on individualized attention
and the considerable capabilities of the retarded.
A right to habilitation under state law has been virtually ig-
nored in Pennhurst and other cases. In Pennsylvania, just prior to
the decision of the United States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognized a right under state law 32 to habilitation
in an individualized fashion in the least restrictive environment. 
133
This support for the right, independent of constitutional assertions,
is currently the subject of the remand in Pennhurst.
Each state has some type of statute which supports the constitu-
128. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 160-61.
129. Id. at 162.
130. Id. at 160-62.
131. This is not to suggest that the more positive right to habilitation not be asserted.
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 164-70.
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969) provides: "The department [of pub-
lic welfare] shall have the power and its duty shall be: (1) To assure within the State the
availability and equitable provision of adequate mental health and mental retardation serv-
ices for all persons who need them, regardless of religion, race, color, national origin, settle-
ment, residence, or economic or social status."
133. In re Joseph Schmidt, 429 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1981).
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tional and statutory rights found to have been violated by the opera-
tion of Pennhurst.134 Many state statutes establish a state law right
to habilitation or treatment. 35 Some speak to a state responsibility
or policy to provide habilitation or treatment.136 Supplementing or
complementing the state law right to habilitation, 37 several states
explicitly require the provision of habilitative services in the least
restrictive environment, 38 and some specifically require an individ-
ual habilitation plan.' 39 Each of these statutes may be considered as
an alternative means of securing habilitative services in the commu-
nity for mentally retarded citizens.
The Supreme Court decision in Pennhurst essentially struck
down a congressional attempt to rectify a situation it had helped
134. In utilizing state law, state constitutions should not be overlooked. For example, the
Pennsylvania constitution contains a provision which is similar to the fourteenth amend-
ment and might be used to establish a state based constitutional right to habilitation. PA.
CONST. art. 1 § 1. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4502 (West Supp. 1981); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 27-10.5-115 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-575a (West 1958); DEL. CODE, tit.
16, §§ 5502-5507, & tit. 9 § 2612 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 394.459 (West
Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 56-238 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 91 , § 2-102(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-1.6-2 (Burns Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN.
LAWS, ch. 123, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 38-1201
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,141 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171-A:13 (Supp.
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-9 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-8 (1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122-55.6 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.85 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 27B-8-11 (1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 5547-300, §§ 7, 11 (Vernon
Supp. 1980-1981); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 3613 (Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.61
(West Supp. 1980-1981).
136. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-50-11, -52-51 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1002(i),
-1009(a) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2502 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 333 E-1, E-2
(1976 & Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 59A, § 2 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 2
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981) (in addition to state right); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 330.1116 (1980); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 13.01 (McKinney 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 43A, §§ 50, 93 (West 1979); S.C. CODE § 44-21-20 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-501
(1977); VA. CODE § 37.1-194 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.20.010 (1975).
137. Since habilitation, by definition, encompasses normalization, notes 21-24 and ac-
companying text, specifically including a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environ-
ment should not be considered a precondition to community services over the institution.
138. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-55 1.01 (West Supp. 1980-1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.459 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 911/2, § 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-
1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-9 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-8 (1978); OKLA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 43A, §§ 50, 93 (West 1979); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 40.1-21-4, -22-6, -22-11
(Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 44-21-20 (1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300,
§§ 7,11 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-9, -5-4(j), -2-3 (1980); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 51.61 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 91 , § 2-102(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-8 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-
55.6 (1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.85 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 27B-8-11 (1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-9, -5-4(j), -2-3 (1980).
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support with federal funding. Congress recognized then what is
known now, that federal programs have promoted rather than dis-
couraged institutionalization of the mentally retarded. 40 Although
the staff has increased at institutions, the quality of life for persons
confined in them has not improved,' 4' and as a general matter fed-
eral standards, laudable as they may be, are not enforced by either
the state or federal governments.
42
Individual enforcement of individually held rights is crucial to
the realization of habilitation for retarded citizens. The embodi-
ment of such rights in a federal statute has been reduced by the
Supreme Court to mere precatory language. Because of the various
grounds still remaining for affirmance of the original order of the
district court, class members continue to leave Pennhurst for appro-
priate community settings. To date, the individually tailored relief
for class members has been successful in Pennsylvania, in large
measure because of the existence of monitoring and review systems
created by the district court in the form of a special master. 
4
1
While the Supreme Court has declined to recognize that individu-
ally held rights exist under the DD Act's Bill of Rights section, class
and individual actions must continue to seek alternative grounds for
the enforcement of rights of the citizens of the United States who
have been promised services on the basis of their disability and de-
nied them.
140. Center on Human Policy, Title XlXandDeinstitutonalization: The Issuefor the 80"s
19 (1981) ["Despite federal laws and court rulings endorsing the principle of least restrictive
alternative, despite the deinstitutionalization thrust of Medicaid legislation and regulations,
and despite a significant body of professional opinion opposing institutionalization, the
ICF/MR program is contributing directly the perpetuation of segregated institutions for the
developmentally disabled."]
141. Id. at 21.
142. Id. at 91.
143. Office of the Special Master, Report to the Court.: The Individuals Who Moved From
Pennhurst (February, 1981).
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